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The Institution of Intercourse 
Andrea Dworkin on the Biblical Foundations of Violence against 
Women  
Julie Kelso, Bond University and the University of Queensland  
Abstract 
According to the late Radical Feminist thinker Andrea Dworkin, in her notorious 
book Intercourse (1987), women’s second-class status is attributable to the socially 
constructed definition of our bodies as lacking in physical integrity during 
intercourse. As a strictly materialist analysis of intercourse, of intercourse as an 
institutional practice distinct from intercourse as an unmediated individual 
experience, Dworkin’s focus is on those discourses (literary, philosophical, 
religious, legal) that have effectively constructed the political meaning of 
intercourse. Her analysis concerns the broader and complicated contextual 
relations of power within which the act takes place. It is this socially constructed 
determination of intercourse as “a means or the means of physiologically making a 
woman inferior” that underwrites all violence against women, indeed what 
naturalizes it, according to Dworkin. In this essay, I shall explore Dworkin’s 
discussions concerning the role of Genesis 2:4b-4:1 and the sodomy laws in 
Leviticus in the institutionalization of intercourse. 
Keywords 
Andrea Dworkin; Intercourse; Genesis; Leviticus; violence. 
The metaphysical ground rules for male and female were set in Genesis, in the 
beginning. The implications have been comprehended deeply and honed into laws 
and practices. The implications go far beyond the letter of the law, especially 
beyond the specific small laws that regulate the when and how of intercourse. The 
implications honor the basic law, men’s ownership of women through intercourse.1  
Introduction 
In neo-liberal democratic societies, the last decade or so has seen a resurgence in 
second-wave feminist demands for women’s safety in public spaces, but also 
especially in the private realms. Domestic violence is now being described as an 
“epidemic” across the world. According to the 2013 World Health Organisation 
Report, approximately 30% of women in the world are affected by intimate partner 
violence. In Australia where I live, on average one woman a week is murdered by 
her intimate partner.2 While there has been a suggestion recently that this revived 
                                                                  
1 Dworkin 1987, 193-4. 
2 See the White Ribbon website for details and access to the criminological research data behind 
these figures. Available online http://www.whiteribbon.org.au/white-ribbon-importance  
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focus on male violence against women is part of a fourth-wave of feminism,3 it is 
important to note that this wave’s demands are remarkably similar to that of the 
second wave of feminism known as “radical feminism.” In particular, in 
mainstream media we have seen the return of the 1970s radical feminist term 
“rape culture.” One of the most infamous and certainly most divisive radical 
feminist figures of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s who worked tirelessly, as both a 
writer and an activist, towards revealing the nature of rape culture was the late 
Andrea Dworkin. In this essay, my interest is with her argument that intercourse 
itself must be analysed robustly in its context of male-dominated and male-
supremacist societies, indeed as one of its principal institutions. While Dworkin 
never actually claimed that all intercourse is rape (despite the habitual and 
continued insistence of that thesis in the mainstream media and in cyberspace 
whenever her name is mentioned), she does insist that women’s lives could never 
be valued as properly human—in the existentialist sense of being essential rather 
than inessential lives—without an unflinchingly honest appraisal of intercourse in 
male supremacist societies. In other words, it is not the case that, for Dworkin, 
intercourse has always been and will always be demeaning for women, or that it is 
ontologically the same as rape. Rather, in societies that hold the male of the 
species as supreme and the female as delightfully incidental—a footnote to the 
man’s story or a moon orbiting around planet man—when considering why rape 
culture is able to persist, we must consider the role of intercourse itself.  
When we think of the Bible and the issue of violence against women, we 
tend to go straight to those stories and legal texts that are well-known to us from 
decades of feminist work in the discipline. We are familiar with Genesis 34, Num. 
31:7-18, 2 Samuel 13, Jdg. 21:10-24, the laws found in Deuteronomy (21:10; 
22:23-9), and the gendered language of violence in the prophets, just to name a 
few. In this essay, however, I want to explore Dworkin’s discussions concerning 
the sodomy laws in Leviticus and the story of Adam and Eve in Gen. 2:4b-4:1 
with respect to what she perceives to be their foundational role in the 
institutionalization of intercourse. Dworkin is interested in the religious and legal 
discourses that help to create the political meaning of intercourse and legitimize 
what she considers often to be the actual and devastating violence of the act on the 
woman in male supremacist societies: the erosion of the self and the compliant 
acceptance of lower status. I shall first explore her arguments concerning 
intercourse before moving to a discussion of her readings of the biblical texts. I 
give much space, in what follows, to Dworkin’s own words, though I carefully 
seek to understand them in the context of the book (Intercourse) as a whole. 
Dworkin has been (naively) either demonised or hagiographised in the media and 
in the Academy, and both sides pick and choose passages from her work without 
attending to their immediate ideational context and thus without giving her the 
critical attention I believe her ideas deserve.4   
 
 
 
                                                                  
3 On the question of whether a fourth wave is underway, see Munro (n.d.). 
4 A notable exception to this is Jenefsky with Russo (1998). 
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The Institution of Intercourse 
In her notorious book Intercourse (1987), Andrea Dworkin claims that women’s 
second-class status is possibly attributable to the socially-constructed definition of 
our bodies as lacking in physical integrity during intercourse. In male supremacist 
societies like ours, “Woman” is that which is entered, penetrated, occupied, and 
denied privacy, and naturally so: 
She, a human being, is supposed to have a privacy that is absolute; except 
that she, a woman, has a hole between her legs that men can, must, do 
enter. This hole, her hole, is synonymous with entry. A man has an anus 
that can be entered, but his anus is not synonymous with entry. A woman 
has an anus that can be entered, but her anus is not synonymous with 
entry. The slit between her legs, so simple, so hidden…that slit which 
means entry into her–intercourse–appears to be the key to women’s lower 
human status. (Dworkin 1987, 144-6) 
As a strictly materialist analysis of intercourse, Dworkin’s analysis concerns 
intercourse as an institutional practice distinct from intercourse as an unmediated 
individual experience (as if possible). As Jenefsky with Russo (1998) helpfully 
point out, this is akin to Adrienne Rich’s now classic anaylsis of motherhood as an 
institution rather than any individual experience of motherhood (Rich 1976; 
Jenefsky with Russo 1998, 99). As such, Dworkin’s focus is on those discourses 
(literary, philosophical, religious, legal) that have effectively constructed the 
political meaning of intercourse in male dominated societies. Her analysis 
concerns the broader and complicated relations of power within which the act 
takes place and which effectively have historically made the subjugation of women 
through the act somewhat mandatory for their existence. For so long now and, 
Dworkin maintains, across all cultures, woman “is defined by how she is made, 
that hole, which is synonymous with entry” (1987, 145). Dworkin points out that 
no other oppressed people are cast as “being made for intercourse: for penetration, 
entry, occupation” (ibid.). We cannot analogize this situation with colonial 
occupation, or racism, or the oppression and abuse of children, or the Gulag, for 
example, because:  
There is nothing that happens to any other civilly inferior people that is 
the same in its meaning and in its effect even when those people are forced 
into sexual availability, heterosexual or homosexual; while subject people, 
for instance, may be forced to have intercourse with those who dominate 
them, the God who does not exist 5  did not make human existence, 
broadly speaking, dependent on their compliance. (1987, 145-6) 
It is this socially and religiously constructed determination of intercourse as “a 
means or the means of physiologically making a woman inferior” that underwrites 
all violence against women, indeed what naturalises it, according to Dworkin. 
And foundational to all of this, at least in the Judeo-Christian traditions, is “the 
metaphysical laws of dominance articulated in Genesis” (1987, 195).  
                                                                  
5 Dworkin repeatedly uses this phrase “the God who does not exist” throughout Intercourse. She is 
gesturing at these points to Edna O’Brien who, in Girls in Their Married Bliss, writes “Oh, God, who 
does not exist, you hate women, otherwise you’d have made them different.” O’Brien (1964) cited 
in Dworkin (1987, 143). 
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For Dworkin, feminist thought in particular has more often than not been 
marked by a refusal to confront the political meaning of intercourse. This refusal 
marks not only conservative thinking, but liberalism and radicalism as well. She 
states: 
Intercourse is fun, not oppression. Intercourse is pleasure, not an 
expression or confirmation of a state of being that is either ontological or 
social. Intercourse is because the God who does not exist made it; he did 
it right, not wrong; and he does not hate women even if women hate him. 
Liberals refuse categorically to inquire into even a possibility that there is 
a relationship between intercourse per se and the low status of women. 
Conservatives use what appears to be God’s work to justify a social and 
moral hierarchy in which women are lesser than men. Radicalism on the 
meaning of intercourse—its political meaning to women, its impact on 
our very being itself—is tragedy or suicide … What intercourse is for 
women and what it does to women’s identity, privacy, self-respect, self-
determination, and integrity are forbidden questions; and yet how can a 
radical or any woman who wants freedom not ask precisely these 
questions? The quality of the sensation or the need for a man or the desire 
for love: these are not answers to questions of freedom; they are diversions 
into complicity and ignorance. (1987, 147)  
It is necessary to point out that Dworkin’s thinking is heavily influenced by the 
existentialism of Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre. She is particularly 
committed to the Sartrean and Beauvoirean ideal of freedom as autonomous 
living, where subjects are free to pursue their transcendence, forging projects of 
their own, but only on the condition of the freedom of others. Like Beauvoir (2011) 
before her, Dworkin maintains that this pursuit is more difficult for women, if even 
possible at all, because of their prescribed function as inessential “other” for men.  
Dworkin thus rejects the 1960s and 1970s radical libertine mandate that sex 
is freedom, considering it yet another means whereby men get women to accept 
their lower status. With libertinism, thinks Dworkin, women do not experience 
their own sexual liberation, despite what they might think is the case; instead they 
are merely agreeing to give men what they want and in greater quantities. In Right-
Wing Women (1983), Dworkin points out that in the late-1960s, prior to the rise of 
radicalized feminism in the US, the men of the counter-cultural New Left 
“agitated for and fought for and argued for and even organized for and even 
provided political and economic resources for abortion rights for women” because 
if abortion were not available to women on demand, then “fucking would not be 
available to men on demand” (95). With the rise of feminist consciousness came 
the demise of the men of the New Left’s concern for women’s abortion rights, as 
women began to see how they had been used as sexual objects: “The leftist men 
turned from political activism: without the easy lay, they were not prepared to 
engage in radical politics” (97-8). 6 
                                                                  
6 The most cited example of the sexism of the counter-cultural New Left is Stokely Carmichael’s 
statement, in 1966, that “the only position for women in the SNCC [Student Non-violent Co-
ordinating Committee] is prone.” For a critical history of the problematic relationship between 
feminism and the New Left in the US, see Echols (2002), who, while obviously agreeing with the 
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Writing about Flaubert’s Emma Bovary, Dworkin declares that with Emma 
the modern era begins, an era she describes as “the petite bourgeoisie seeking 
freedom” (1987, 125). Emma’s supposed liberation does not come about through 
increased education or economic reform, but through sex. Dworkin states with 
respect to Flaubert’s novel: “Female freedom is defined strictly in terms of 
committing forbidden sexual acts. Female heroism is in getting fucked and 
wanting it” (ibid.). The so-called sexual liberation movement of the 1960s and 
1970s crystallises this delusion of the modern era for Dworkin: 
The brilliance of objectification as a strategy of dominance is that it gets 
the woman to take the initiative in her own degradation (having less 
freedom is degrading). The woman herself takes one kind of responsibility 
absolutely and thus commits herself to her own continuing inferiority: she 
polices her own body; she internalizes the demands of the dominant class 
and, in order to be fucked, she constructs her life around meeting those 
demands. It is the best system of colonization on earth: she takes on the 
burden, the responsibility of her own submission, her own objectification 
… Whatever intercourse is, it is not freedom; and if it cannot exist without 
objectification, it never will be. Instead occupied women will be 
collaborators, more base in their collaboration than other collaborators 
have ever been: experiencing pleasure in their own inferiority; calling 
intercourse freedom. It is a tragedy beyond the power of language to 
convey when what has been imposed on women by force becomes a 
standard of freedom for women: and all the women say it is so. (1987, 
169) 
In her analyses of cultural products from pornography to high literature, Dworkin 
concludes that sexual intercourse cannot take place without the objectification of 
the woman. She wonders what intercourse could be like without objectification, 
whether it is even possible in societies drenched in the ideology of male power and 
dominance: 
Can intercourse exist without objectification? Would intercourse be a 
different phenomenon if it could, if it did? ... [C]an objectification exist 
without the woman turning herself into an object—becoming through 
effort and art a thing, less than human, so that he can be more than 
human, hard, sovereign, king? Can intercourse exist without the woman 
herself turning herself into a thing, which she must do because men 
cannot fuck equals and men must fuck: because one price of dominance is 
that one is impotent in the face of equality? (1987, 166) 
Clearly, Dworkin’s analysis of an act that for many heterosexual women is not 
(always, or perhaps even often) unpleasant or overtly subjugating is confronting to 
say the least. And, I presume, many heterosexual men resent being told they are 
violators of women. It is well-known that Dworkin was and largely still is 
dismissed as “anti-sex” or “sex-negative” by her theoretical adversaries, male and 
female. This typecast dismissal harkens back to reactions to Dworkin’s earlier 
book Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1989; first published in 1981), and her 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
well-documented problems between feminists and the men of the New Left, nevertheless suggests 
that all was not as grim as feminists like Dworkin, Marge Piercy and Robin Morgan would have it.  
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allegiance with the feminist lawyer Catherine MacKinnon, but then set in stone 
after the publication of Intercourse. Dworkin has indeed come to be understood as a 
thinker who rejects entirely what is known as heterosex in the West: intercourse.  
However, for Dworkin, the term “sex-negative” is “the current secular reductio ad 
absurdum used to dismiss or discredit ideas, particularly political critiques, that 
might lead to detumescence” (1987, 57).  
Intercourse, Dworkin argues, is understood as a sacred act by both the 
moral Right and the progressive Left, and as such cannot in itself be criticized. 
‘Fucking’ is a good thing, and this good thing is powerfully related to the idea of 
citizenship in ‘Amerika’: 
In Amerika, there is nearly this universal conviction—or so it appears—
that sex (fucking) is good and that liking it is right: morally right; a sign of 
human health; nearly a standard for citizenship. Even those who believe 
in original sin and have a theology of hellfire and damnation express this 
Amerikan creed, an optimism that glows in the dark: sex is good, healthy, 
wholesome, pleasant, fun; we like it, we enjoy it, we want it, we are 
cheerful about it; it is as simple as we are, the citizens of this strange 
country with no memory and no mind. (Dworkin 1987, 55) 
To analyse the function of intercourse almost equates to treason. This analysis, 
Dworkin reminds us, is not the same as the arguments about sex between the 
Right and the Left in 1970s and 1980s America, where the question concerned 
“whether or not this good thing is good outside marriage or between persons of the 
same gender (however they manage it)” (1987, 55). Instead, to question the 
function of intercourse, to analyse and scrutinize the act in search of its concealed 
political, cultural, economic, and social service to men, is to render oneself silent 
in the process: 
On both Right and Left, a citizen had best be prepared to affirm her 
loyalty to the act itself. Ambivalence or dissent impugns her credibility; a 
good attitude is requisite before she is allowed to speak—in magazines, on 
television, in political groups. (Dworkin 1987, 56) 
The fact that Dworkin is today rarely engaged with in a substantial manner,7 or 
that her ideas are rarely taught except as of interest to those keen on the history of 
feminism, is perhaps testimony to the fact that Dworkin was right on one count at 
least: if you, a woman, criticize intercourse you will be silenced. In a sense, this is 
the main point of Intercourse: men are afforded the ability to describe intercourse in 
all its ambiguities, the good and the bad, while women must simply like it. In the 
Preface to the second edition of Intercourse (republished in the Twentieth 
Anniversary Edition), Dworkin explains: 
In general women get to say yea or nay to intercourse, which is taken to 
be a synonym for sex, echt sex. In this reductive brave new world, women 
like sex or we do not. We are loyal to sex or we are not. The range of 
emotions and ideas expressed by Tolstoy et al. is literally forbidden to 
                                                                  
7  Though see Brecher (2013). As part of its “Patriarchy 2013” series, The New Left Project 
included the topic “Why we should re-read Andrea Dworkin’s ‘Pornography: Men Possessing 
Women.’” See also Lucas (2011, 74-81). 
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contemporary women. Remorse, sadness, despair, alienation, obsession, 
fear, greed, hate—all of which men, especially male artists, express—are 
simple no votes for women. Compliance means yes; a simplistic rah-rah 
means yes; affirming the implicit right of men to get laid regardless of the 
consequences to women is a yes (2006, xxxiii). 
We should also remember that Leo Bersani’s famous sentence “There is a big 
secret about sex: most people don’t like it” also appeared in the same year as 
Intercourse (Bersani 1987). To my knowledge, Bersani was not dismissed as a “sex-
negative” thinker. 8 
As a consequence, this general prohibition against women criticising 
intercourse has led to gross distortions of Dworkin’s analysis. Dworkin was and 
still is regularly charged with claiming in Intercourse that all intercourse is rape. 
Even those feminist sisters who have insisted on challenging the reduction of sex 
to intercourse find Dworkin too much to bear. This is because for such feminists—
those who reject essentialistic or biologically determined understandings of male-
female sexuality, as does Dworkin—Dworkin seems to dismiss all forms of 
heterosexual intercourse under patriarchy because of the physical difference 
between women and men.  Consider the following oft-quoted paragraph: 
This is nihilism; or this is truth. He has to push in past boundaries. There 
is the outline of a body, distinct, separate, its integrity an illusion, a tragic 
deception, because unseen there is a slit between the legs, and he has to 
push into it. There is never a real privacy of the body that can coexist with 
intercourse: with being entered. The vagina itself is muscled and the 
muscles have to be pushed apart. The thrusting is persistent invasion. She 
is opened up, split down the centre. She is occupied—physically, 
internally, in her privacy. (Dworkin 1987, 143) 
When we consider this passage out of context,9 it seems that Dworkin is quite 
clearly arguing that all intercourse is, if not rape, then an invasion, a violence 
perpetrated against the woman. Not only is this invasion physically violent, with 
muscles being pushed apart, but it is psychologically violent because a woman’s 
sense of privacy (admittedly a modern conception of the individual) is negated 
through the act. Passages such as this one have led certain scholars to view 
Dworkin as a radically-separatist feminist who insists that women refrain from 
intercourse with men because it has been, is and will always be an undermining, 
indeed destruction, of a woman’s ability to exist as a viable, self-determining 
subject in the world, a human being with integrity. The problem for such scholars 
is one of biological determinism: because of our physical differences, men will 
always control women through the act of intercourse; women will always be 
                                                                  
8 Thanks to Erin Runions for reminding me of Bersani’s essay. 
9 She is, in fact, responding to the depictions of intercourse given by the male authors she has 
analysed in the preceding six chapters, along with a passage from Edna O’Brien’s Girls in Their 
Married Bliss, used as the epigraph to Chapter Seven “Occupation/Collaboration” (Dworkin 1987, 
143). 
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victims because of their objectification.10 But is this what Dworkin is actually 
saying? 
First of all, Dworkin has always insisted that she never argued that all 
intercourse is rape. In an interview with her friend, the British novelist Michael 
Moorcock, she states: 
No, I wasn't saying that [all heterosexual sex is rape] and I didn't say that, 
then or ever ... The whole issue of intercourse as this culture's penultimate 
expression of male dominance became more and more interesting to me 
… Since the paradigm for sex has been one of conquest, possession, and 
violation, I think many men believe they need an unfair advantage, which 
at its extreme would be called rape. I don't think they need it. I think both 
intercourse and sexual pleasure can and will survive equality. (1995) 
While not rape (and perhaps here is where the confusion begins), Dworkin does 
think that intercourse is a violent act. For example, in an interview with Michael 
Sheldon she states: “Penetrative intercourse is, by its nature, violent. But I'm not 
saying that sex must be rape. What I think is that sex must not put women in a 
subordinate position. It must be reciprocal and not an act of aggression from a 
man looking only to satisfy himself. That's my point” (2000). Does this mean that, 
despite any agency or intention on the part of the man, no matter his goodness, his 
kind-heartedness or his desire for intimacy, by its very nature by having 
intercourse with a woman he is committing violence? It is interesting that 
Dworkin’s comments about the possibilities of intercourse being “communion, a 
sharing, mutual possession of an enormous mystery; it has the intensity and 
magnificence of violent feeling transformed into tenderness” (1987, 71) are rarely if 
ever quoted. Such possibilities are entertained all throughout Dworkin’s oeuvre, 
especially the idea that it is a remarkably human accomplishment to transform 
what she believes (along with Freud and Bataille) to be the violent nature of eros 
into intimacy and tenderness. Yet, such aspects of her thinking never seemed to 
catch on, in the media or in the Academy. In other words, Dworkin believes it 
entirely possibly for human sexuality to be conceived as having “the intensity and 
magnificence of violent feeling transformed into tenderness” (ibid.); it is just that 
we do not live in a world with such a sexual script as the dominant one.    
In the book itself Dworkin’s concern is with the historically dominant 
depiction of intercourse as the occupation and possession of women by men, an act 
that sustains the sexual hierarchicalization of strictly differentiated genders 
necessary to male supremacist societies. Her concern is to de-naturalise all aspects 
of the act to reveal the ideology of male dominance at work: 
Intercourse is commonly written about and comprehended as a form of 
possession or an act of possession in which, during which, because of 
which, a man inhabits a woman, physically covering her and 
overwhelming her and at the same time penetrating her; and this physical 
relation to her—over her and inside her—is his possession of her. He has 
her, or, when he is done, he has had her. By thrusting in to her, he takes 
                                                                  
10 An alternative criticism comes from the stalwart liberal philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who 
insists on the potentially positive aspects of objectification during sex. See Nussbaum (1995), 
Papadaki (2015) and Lucas (2011, 74-81). 
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her over. His thrusting into her is taken to be a capitulation to him as 
conqueror; it is a physical surrender of herself to him; he occupies and 
rules her, expresses his elemental dominance over her, by his possession of 
her in the fuck. (Dworkin 1987, 73)  
Thus, while intercourse is not rape, because Dworkin refuses to consider 
intercourse as isolated from broader discursive influence, she asks us to consider 
the very intrinsic service of intercourse in male dominant societies, how these 
dominant scripts both create and maintain male power over women. And it is 
important to realise that Dworkin is making this argument through her critical 
analyses of predominantly male-authored literature. None of Dworkin’s 
statements about intercourse are based solely on her own experience or anecdotal 
evidence: the book is largely about men and their conceptions and depictions of 
intercourse. 
In the first section of the book, “Intercourse in a Man-made World,” 
Dworkin provides five chapters that are careful and incisive analyses of important 
works of literature by men whom she has described as “phenomenal writers on 
issues of power and freedom” (1992)—notably Leo Tolstoy, Kobe Abe, Tennessee 
Williams, James Baldwin, and Isaac Bashevis Singer (I’ll focus only on her 
reading of Tolstoy, here). These chapters starkly reveal for Dworkin the truth of 
what men in male supremacist societies think of intercourse with women and how 
they are depicted as treating women before, during, and after the act.  
Interestingly, Dworkin shows how intercourse, for these men at least, is not 
simple, enjoyable, and unproblematic, as is the banal yet dominant cliché about 
sexuality, especially the young, straight man’s sexuality. For example, Leo 
Tolstoy’s main character in his Kreutzer Sonata is driven by desire to have sex with 
his wife, only to be repulsed by her afterwards. In between their sexual encounters 
he is either cruel to her or he ignores her, until his desire gets the better of him and 
he wants to have sex with her again.11 As Dworkin points out, however, the 
repulsion felt for the wife is not caused by his disgust at her body or some puritan 
loathing of carnality itself. He loathes her because in intercourse her necessary 
inferiority to him becomes apparent. The great social critic of inequality (Tolstoy) 
believes intercourse must be eradicated if men and women are to be equal because 
intercourse makes exploiters of men and slaves of women: 
[T]he enslavement of woman lies simply in the fact that people desire, and 
think it good, to avail themselves of her as a tool of enjoyment. Well, and 
they liberate woman, give her all sorts of rights equal to man, but continue 
to regard her as an instrument of enjoyment, and so educate her in 
childhood and afterwards by public opinion. And there she is, still the 
same and depraved slave, and the man still a depraved slave-owner. They 
emancipate women in universities and in law courts, but continue to 
regard her as an object of enjoyment. Teach her, as she is taught among 
us, to regard herself as such, and she will always remain an inferior being. 
(Tolstoy 1967, 385) 
                                                                  
11 The story is largely autobiographical (though Tolstoy never actually murdered his wife), as 
revealed by the diaries kept by the Countess, Sophie Tolstoy. See Dworkin (1987, 5-8). 
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Tolstoy’s protagonist also loathes his wife (and ultimately kills her) because her 
sensuality renders him powerless to her charms, according to him. Because women 
are made to be inferior through their sexual objectification they enact their 
revenge, says Tolstoy, by enslaving men through sex. As Dworkin points out, the 
logic here is somewhat perverse: men are favoured by laws, rights and privileges 
and yet they perceive themselves to be dominated by women in their revenge 
against men for their lower status. Yet, women can only achieve some perceived 
level of power by assuming their inferior status in intercourse, because otherwise 
men would not desire them: 
According to the killer/husband, the inferiority of women in society, 
including the civil inferiority of women, originates in intercourse, because 
in intercourse the woman is not, and cannot be, the equal of men ... Men 
need inequality in order to fuck; and equality means that men also need to 
be chaste. (Dworkin 1987, 19) 
It is crucial to note that it is Tolstoy who is arguing that intercourse reduces 
women to slavery. While Dworkin insists that intercourse must be rigorously 
analysed for its complicity in the maintenance of men’s domination of women, it is 
Tolstoy who is in fact suggesting its elimination from human behaviour. To my 
knowledge, Tolstoy was never silenced because of this idea, nor deemed “sex 
negative.” Again, it seems that it is only women who must not criticize the act.  
Law, Nature and the (Biblical) Metaphysics of Male Supremacy 
Dworkin’s discussion of Leviticus and Gen. 2:4b-4:1 occurs in Chapter Eight, 
“Law.” This is the first chapter of the third and final section of the book, titled 
“Power, Status, Hate.” This final section investigates the means by which 
intercourse has been and still is regulated through civil and religious institutions. 
Contrary to the idea that intercourse is simply a matter of choice and an act that 
takes place in privacy, Dworkin argues that the fact that religious and civil laws 
have always sought to control the determination of both legitimate and illegitimate 
sex is proof that intercourse is a social construct central to the institution of male 
supremacy: 
Any act so controlled by the state, proscribed and prescribed in detail, 
cannot be private in the ordinary sense. Privacy is essentially a sphere of 
freedom immune from regulation by the state. In that sense, intercourse 
has never occurred in private. The society and its police (including priests 
in religious states) have had too much to do with establishing the terms of 
the act itself … Intercourse has never been comprehended by law as a 
private act of personal freedom except in one limited sense: those who 
belong to men as chattel property or who are used by them as sexual 
objects (the modern equivalent of chattel property) can be encompassed in 
a man’s privacy such that they disappear altogether inside it. (1987, 173-4)  
In other words, the issue of sexual privacy in law has only ever concerned a man’s 
right to use his wife for anything and in any way he wants.  
There are three ways that legal restrictions on sexual activity maintain the 
strict gender demarcation requisite if domination of one over the other can occur. 
First there are those laws that insist that a man only have sex with someone not 
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like him, i.e. someone with a vagina and a womb. Dworkin quotes Norman 
Mailer, whom she describes as combining the best of both Proust and Leviticus 
when he writes: 
Yes, it is the irony of prison life that it is a world where everything is 
homosexual and yet nowhere is the condition of being a female male more 
despised. It is because one is used, one is a woman without the power to 
be female, one is fucked without a womb. (Mailer cited in Dworkin 1987, 
181) 
Women are useful because of their capacity to reproduce for men. Indeed, argues 
Dworkin, in both Proust and Mailer the “real man” as opposed to the “female 
man” is affirmed by women’s ability to reproduce, “with the whole meaning of the 
fuck—gender—being resolved by its outcome in producing children. Sensual 
pleasure is not what distinguishes homosexual sodomy from heterosexual fucking: 
the woman bearing the child does—in religion, in Mailer” (Dworkin 1987, 182). 
Sodomy laws are thus obviously related to those laws that regulate what exactly a 
man can do to a woman, when and why. Rules or laws that prohibit oral or anal 
sex with women as against nature serve male power: 
The creation of gender (so-called nature) by law was systematic, 
sophisticated, supremely intelligent; behavior regulated to produce social 
conditions of power and powerlessness experienced by the individuals 
inside the social system as the sexual natures inside them as individuals. 
There were the great, broad laws: prohibiting sodomy; proscribing fucking 
in marriage; directing the fuck to the vagina, not the mouth or the rectum 
of the woman because men have mouths and rectums too; legitimizing the 
fuck when it produces children; each turn of the screw so to speak 
heightening gender polarity and increasing male power over women, 
fucking itself the way of creating and maintaining that power. (Dworkin 
1987, 184)  
The second form of regulation concerns laws that prevent men from being treated 
like women, that is, penetrated. These are the biblical sodomy laws themselves. 
Dworkin argues that all laws concerning sexuality, especially the sodomy laws 
deriving from Leviticus (“Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind; it 
is an abomination,” 18:22; Änd if a man lie with mankind, as with womankind, 
both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; 
their blood shall be upon them,” 20:13) along with the cross-dressing law in Deut. 
22:5 (“A woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a 
man put on a woman’s garment; for whosoever doeth these things is an 
abomination unto the Lord thy God”), are there to maintain a strict demarcation 
of gender, so that the heteronormative hierarchy of man over woman can be 
maintained. When gender is blurred, particularly in sexual acts, male supremacy 
as a system of power becomes less potent.  
Dworkin is particularly interested in sodomy laws and how their true 
purpose, according to her, is to maintain man’s civil and sexual superiority over 
women through the controlling of the lust of men. The logic is that if men as a 
class are dominant, each male feels it his right to dominate another, anyone he 
might choose. However, if he starts to dominate another man instead of a woman, 
then these men have to endure what women are there for in the service of male 
THE BIBLE & CRITICAL THEORY  
 
 
 
ARTICLES  VOLUME 12, NUMBER 2, 2016 35 
 
 
supremacy, and “naturally” so. She begins her discussion with Augustine’s 
association of lust with dominance. Before the fall, thinks Augustine, man and 
woman had sex without lust: “a man and his wife could play their active and 
passive roles in the drama of conception without the lecherous promptings of lust, 
with perfect serenity of soul and with no sense of disintegration between body and 
soul” (Augustine 1958, 318). In Eden, before the fall, we see the dichotomized 
gender positions as active and passive, even without lust. Sodomy, according to 
Augustine is a sin against nature, male nature at least, as created by his God, and 
thus a crime against his God. As Dworkin points out, despite the centuries 
between them, both Mailer and Augustine are remarkably similar in their 
descriptions of the lust of dominance as  
an ecstasy, a frenzy, cruelty, all-encompassing, dominance in the fuck as a 
supreme and superb pleasure. Men are not supposed to have to endure 
being the victims of this lust; perhaps there is an implicit recognition that 
the subordination itself, the carnal experience of it, would change them, 
their so-called nature—create in them the incompleteness, the low self-
esteem, so commonplace in women under male dominance. (1987, 183) 
Sodomy laws are there to protect men as a class from the degradation of being 
made woman-like. In the Judeo-Christian traditions, sodomy is understood as an 
abomination, a violation of male nature such that it presents “a nightmare vision 
of one kind of sexual equality: men used by men as women are in sex to satisfy the 
lust for dominance expressed in the fuck” (Dworkin 1987, 183). 
Relatedly, the third category concerns those laws that maintain male 
control over their women, adultery laws and rape laws especially. The issue for 
Dworkin, with respect to these laws, is one of restraint. While it is obvious that the 
controlling of women’s and men’s sexual activities is an integral part of social 
organization, what Dworkin argues is that the morality often behind these laws is 
also, as she puts it, “brilliantly pragmatic. Male dominance does best, after all, 
when men do not, generally speaking, fuck themselves to death by fucking 
whatever moves. Restraint is a key to power” (1987, 186). Men must not fuck 
other men’s women because this depletes the power of men as a class by causing 
conflict between them: 
Women are property; adultery, rape, and some forms of incest hurt the 
rightful owners of the women by damaging the value of the goods or by 
violating the man’s integrity through violating his legal and deeply felt 
personal right of private, exclusive access. Following the rules lets men 
have sexual access to subjugated women while moderating male-male 
conflict over that access. (1987, 190) 
For Dworkin, the legitimation of rape in marriage, which she worries now extends 
beyond marriage to include the rights unmarried men have over unmarried 
women, derives in our culture at least not just from the biblical laws concerning 
legitimate and illegitimate sexual practices but from the story of the first man and 
woman in Gen. 2:4b-4:1, where she claims that “the metaphysical ground rules for 
male and female were set” (1987, 193). While in the first version, as we know, 
there is a possible reading of equality between the sexes (“And God created man in 
His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He 
them”; Gen. 1:27), the second creation myth clearly makes woman subservient to 
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man; she is made from him and for him: “made for him from him; bone of his 
bones, flesh of his flesh; and God affirms they are ‘one flesh’” (Dworkin 1987, 
191). It is because of this version that, as Dworkin puts it “Jurists for centuries 
after recognized a man and his wife as one flesh: the man’s” (ibid.). And the 
reason for this is that in the second story we get a strict separation of humanity 
into two genders, whereas the first story hints at their sameness.   
In her reading of the story, when Eve eats from the forbidden fruit her 
“natural” inferiority is manifest, allowing herself to be seduced by a snake. Having 
disobeyed God and seduced Adam into eating the forbidden fruit, it seems that her 
difference from him becomes most apparent: “All of the bone-of-my-bones 
business disappears, in a sense for ever. She and he are ‘one flesh’ in that he has 
sovereignty over her body; but they are different from then on, her bones not 
reminding one of his at all, her flesh so different from his that it might as well have 
been made out of some different material altogether” (Dworkin 1987, 192).  
Here, Dworkin’s thinking is reminiscent of Simone de Beauvoir’s 
existentialist reading of the biblical first man and woman. Beauvoir states: 
Eve was not formed at the same time as man; she was not made either 
from a different substance or from the same clay that Adam was modelled 
from: she was drawn from the first male’s flank. Even her birth was not 
autonomous; God did not spontaneously choose to create her for herself 
and to be directly worshipped in turn: he destined her for man; he gave 
her to Adam to save him from loneliness, her spouse is her origin and her 
finality; she is his complement in the inessential mode. Thus, she appears 
a privileged prey. She is nature raised to a consciousness, she is a naturally 
submissive consciousness. And therein lies the marvellous hope that man 
has often placed in woman: he hopes to accomplish himself as a being 
through carnally possessing a being while making himself confirmed in his 
freedom by a docile freedom. (2011, 164-5) 
For Beauvoir, the second creation story in Genesis, like all creation myths in her 
view, expresses man’s self-servingly necessary conviction that woman is his 
inessential other. Upon her (unorthodox) Hegelian reading, woman is thus  
the perfect intermediary between nature that is foreign to man and the 
peer who is too identical to him. She pits neither the silence of nature nor 
the hard demand of a reciprocal recognition against him; by a unique 
privilege she is a consciousness and yet it seems possible to possess her in 
the flesh. Thanks to her, there is a way to escape the inexorable dialectic 
of the master and the slave that springs from the reciprocity of freedoms. 
(Beauvoir 2011, 164) 
The Genesis myth, for both Beauvoir and Dworkin, reveals how woman is 
conceived by man as a being who, as “a naturally submissive consciousness” 
(Beauvoir), is able to become the property of man, as “one flesh: the man’s” 
(Dworkin). Both Beauvoir and Dworkin pursue the historical outcomes of this 
“othering” of woman, exploring the effects of this biblically gendered metaphysics 
of dominance on women who are “privileged prey” (Beauvoir 2011, 165). For 
Dworkin, this becomes clear in the Genesis myth if we continue to read beyond 
the fall. Eve is famously cursed with pain in childbirth, desire for her husband, and 
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she is made subservient to him. Immediately upon their expulsion, in Genesis 4:1, 
Adam has intercourse with Eve and she bears Cain: “And Adam knew Eve, his 
woman, and she conceived and bore Cain and she said ‘I have gotten/acquired a 
man from/with Yahweh’ (qanîtî ’îsh et yhwh).”12 The issue of Eve’s consent is 
obviously unimportant. Furthermore, Adam and Eve do not walk out of paradise 
and straight into a story concerning Adam’s punishment of life-long toil, nor do 
they emerge from the garden and get attacked by snakes; we go straight to 
intercourse and the issue of man’s dominion over woman. So, summarises 
Dworkin: “Eve’s curse is in the pain of childbirth and in feeling desire for her 
husband; they are her punishments. The rule of the husband over the wife is in 
sexual intercourse; his sovereignty over her is in the fuck” (1987, 192).  
We might claim that Dworkin’s (and Beauvoir’s) sentiments concerning 
Genesis 2:4b-4:1 and the Levitical laws are no longer relevant, given the current 
(prima facie) recognition of women as “humans” with attendant rights. In 
particular, the idea that a man owns his wife seems rather outdated. However, it is 
quite astonishing to remember that for most western countries it was only in the 
last decades of the twentieth century that laws admitting the possibility of raping 
one’s wife came to be enacted. The idea of the impossibility of rape in marriage is 
usually traced to Matthew Hale, chief justice in seventeenth century England, who 
wrote: 
But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his 
lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife 
hath given up herself in this kind unto the husband which she cannot 
retract. (Hale cited in Dworkin 1987, 194-5) 
In other words, until recently the law in all liberal democracies insisted that 
woman belonged to her husband and part of his ownership concerned his freedom 
to fuck her whenever he wanted, despite her desire. And for Dworkin, “men’s 
ownership of women through the fuck” derives in our biblically-based cultures 
from the Genesis myth. We might think that we have moved well beyond such a 
patriarchal proprietary model. However, research into the recent alarming rises in 
the number of women in western societies who are raped, abused, and murdered 
by their intimate partners, married or not, suggests otherwise. So too does the well-
documented form of male on-line aggression towards women, in order to silence 
them, which is overwhelmingly expressed through language of extreme sexual 
violence. However, while there currently is much outrage from men and women 
over this rise in violence against women, Dworkin cautions us that social outrage 
might not be as trustworthy or as progressive as we might think. She says:  
Social outrage is power protecting itself; it is not morality. There is always 
a tension between the law that protects male power—basic 
fundamentalism, religious or secular—and men’s wanting to break that 
law: exercise the privileges of power for the sake of pleasure … How 
much license can men take without destroying the effectiveness of the 
laws that formally restrain them in order to protect their power as men? ... 
The regulation of men by men in sex for the sake of upholding the power 
                                                                  
12 Genesis 4:1b is notoriously problematic because of the obvious suggestion that it is Yahweh, not 
Adam, who is the father of Cain. 
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of men as a class is the least recognized, least scrutinized aspect of male 
dominance and law as an institution of social control. (1987, 188-90) 
Thus, we might say, just as in the ancient world of the Bible the so-called “rape 
laws” did not recognise the woman as the victim (the victim generally understood 
to be the father or the husband), despite appearance to the contrary, rape laws 
today are still protecting men from a potentially depleted access to resources: 
women.    
Conclusion 
For Dworkin, violence against women, especially domestic abuse and rape, cannot 
be understood or even attended to without a rigorous and uncompromising 
analysis of the meaning of intercourse itself as constructed within societies that 
hold the man as the supreme being; the only one with any real right to self-
determination and indeed humanity. Now, of course, not all men have the same 
levels of power in society, and Dworkin acknowledges this as such. However, the 
physical differences between men and women are always conceived and 
experienced within a male-dominant context: 
Intercourse occurs in a context of a power relation that is pervasive and 
incontrovertible. The context in which the act takes place, whatever the 
meaning of the act in and of itself, is one in which men have social, 
economic, political, and physical power over women. Some men do not 
have all those kinds of power over all women; but all men have some 
kinds of power over all women; and most men have controlling power 
over what they call their women—the women they fuck. (Dworkin 1987, 
148) 
The question of whether intercourse could express sexual equality is a difficult one 
because, Dworkin says, “(h)ow to separate the act of intercourse from the social 
reality of male power is not clear, especially because it is male power that 
constructs both the meaning and the current practice of intercourse as such” (1987, 
150). Intercourse is not and has never been a private act. Indeed, Dworkin argues 
that the classic second-wave radical feminist slogan “the personal is political” is 
ironically in principle the logic of patriarchal law itself, where the social rights 
given to men in male supremacist societies are translated to the private sphere, 
where men (still) hold rights of ownership over women. She states: “The principle 
that ‘the personal is political’ belongs to patriarchal law itself, originating there in a 
virtual synthesis of intimacy and state policy, the private and the public, the penis 
and the rule of men” (187). All of the laws around legitimate sexual practices, 
including those that formally restrain men are, according to Dworkin, instituted to 
protect male supremacy itself, both within the home and beyond. And crucial to 
the maintenance of this ideology is the subjugation of women as “owned through 
the fuck” (188).  
Certain reforms are of course necessary to the task of women’s liberation—
economic equity; the election of women to political office; progressive role models 
for girls; emphasis on the physical strength of women’s bodies; effective rape laws 
and strategies to diminish the incidences of violence against women. Moreover, 
Dworkin recognizes that reforms around women’s sexuality have also been 
necessary—foreplay that defers to female sensualities; less verbal assault of 
THE BIBLE & CRITICAL THEORY  
 
 
 
ARTICLES  VOLUME 12, NUMBER 2, 2016 39 
 
 
women; the eradication of the romanticization of rape, to name a few. However, 
while these reforms might be necessary to the task, they are not in themselves 
sufficient because for Dworkin they do not address the main question: 
Life can be better for women—economic and political conditions 
improved—and at the same time the status of women can remain 
resistant, indeed impervious, to change: so far in history this is precisely 
the paradigm for social change as it relates to the condition of women. 
Reforms are made, important ones; but the status of women relative to 
men does not change … [I]t is clear that reforms do not change women’s 
status relative to men, or have not yet. It is clear that reforms do not 
change the intractability of women’s civil inferiority. Is intercourse itself 
then a basis of or a key to women’s continuing social and sexual 
inequality? (1987, 149; 150-1) 
In other words, Dworkin sees no point in trying to rethink intercourse without 
recognizing its formative function as an institution of male domination and 
supremacy. She recognizes that women and men do experience pleasure in 
intercourse, but thinks it is most likely because we have internalized those binary 
gendered erotics of male dominance and female submission, even if we simply 
swap roles. We could imagine the female body as hospitable, as Irigaray does, for 
example, rather than as occupied territory. Perhaps her body can be conceived of 
as welcoming the male, with enough preparation, such that no violence is intended 
or experienced. The question Dworkin insists on asking, though, is how such a 
rethinking could dismantle the broader structures of male dominant society, 
because until such a dismantling occurs intercourse will remain in its service as its 
most brilliantly effective tool because of the concealment of its mechanisms in 
pleasure. What we see from Genesis 2-4.1 and the Levitical laws concerning 
sexuality is that this institutionalisation of intercourse is entrenched at the base of 
our male-supremacist culture, a base we sadly deem sacred.  
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